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6 
Introduction 
“Honor first.” 
-The United States Border Patrol motto 
 
I am and have always been an American citizen. I am so far removed from the 
consequences of Border Patrol policy in my personal life that two years ago when I was packing 
the night before driving from Connecticut to Montreal with a group of friends for New Years and 
realized my passport was expired, I made a photocopy of my birth certificate, double checked I 
had my driver’s license, and promised my mom that if customs didn’t let me back in the U.S. I 
would call her so she could enlist Senator Richard “Dick” Blumenthal’s help. Immigration policy 
does not endanger me. However, it does engage me.  
There was one line in my notebook from Miles Rodriguez’s class last semester, Migrants 
and Refugees in the Americas, that inspired this project. I wrote, “‘humanitarian crisis’ - Obama. 
Response implied opposite.” My main goal when I started researching was to make sense of the 
logistics of that specific situation (the 2014 response to an increase in violence south of the 
U.S.-Mexico border forcing high numbers of unaccompanied minors to flee to the U.S. and 
Mexico), but also to ask how the government can use terms like “humanitarian crisis” and have it 
not only lead to a negative outcome, but also have a completely different meaning than the one I 
am accustomed to and how the response defines the problem. My project evolved as I focused 
more on the theoretical side of that question. How can the United States Border Patrol claim 
innocence for the harm caused by policy that they wrote and have continued to implement? The 
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aim in writing this was to expose the reality of what Border Patrol has been doing to border 
crossers, and to find a way of defining it that differed from traditional analyses. To do that I 
asked the following questions. What is the nature of deterrence as Border Patrol uses it on the 
U.S.-Mexico border? How does language function in this process? What is the consequence of 
the policy? Lastly, how does the Border Patrol claim innocence, when the policy they are 
implementing leads to humanitarian crises and death? 
Professor Rodriguez’s class was not my first influence. I remember watching an ad in 
grayscale and sepia tone about immigration in my current events class in middle school (early on 
in Obama’s presidency). The production style was similar to that of 80’s anti-drug campaigns. 
The video featured a woman driving a car, a young boy in the back seat, and a white police 
officer pulling her over for a speeding ticket. The child looked over the back seat at the officer 
arresting his mother. Then a wide shot of the car and fade out. I remember that being my first 
impression of immigration and feeling anger and confusion. 
I grew up in a family that constantly discusses the inner workings of political systems and 
how they either do or do not align with the values my older relatives hold. I always found it 
difficult to use reason to draw a line between policy and the emotional impact it has on us, and 
discovered a while ago that it was because there are people behind the policy whose motives and 
intentions are not always clear. In writing this project I believe I found a way to find that clarity 
by tracing a line from policy to human impact and identifying the places along the path where 
there have been attempts to obscure it. 
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The United States is comprised of multiple regions each with its respective border. The 
one I focus on is the Southwest border region, otherwise known as the “southern” border, or the 
U.S.-Mexico border.  The timeline of this project focuses on strategies implemented in the early 1
to mid 1990s, with their effects cited to present. I will use specific language when referencing 
different actors. I refer to individuals who intend to, have already, or are in the process of 
entering the United States from the U.S.-Mexico border as “border crossers,” and to personnel 
monitoring the border as Border Patrol or the Border Patrol. The border crossers come 
predominantly from Central America and Mexico - specifically Honduras, Mexico, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Belize, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica - but also include migrants from other areas in 
Latin America. The Department of Homeland Security includes the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CPB) which is a federal agency that oversees the Border Patrol. 
Chapter 1: El Paso 
On Sunday, September 19, 1993, Border Patrol was stationed along the El Paso sector of 
the border, facing south.  It was a change that shocked the region, which had been used to 2
freedom of movement across the border. It was a shock along the border at every level. 
Blockades might be commonplace in 2019, but the practice up until 1993 in El Paso had been 
1 U.S. General Accounting Agency. “Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More 
Evaluation Needed.” ​Report to the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary, House 
of Representatives. ​Page 6. Accessed April 29, 2019. ​https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/224958.pdf 
 
2 Brinkley, Joel. “A Rare Success at the Border Brought Scant Official Praise.” ​The New York Times.​ Sept. 14, 1994. 
Accessed April 29, 2019. 
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/14/us/a-rare-success-at-the-border-brought-scant-official-praise.html 
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Border Patrol agents driving around the city looking for suspected border crossers,  targeting 3
residents based on their skin tone. Interior apprehension had been used up to that point, which 
usually ended with someone hopping a fence and Border Patrol chasing after them. The most 
immediate response to the new protocol was from Mexican nationals. It was immediately clear 
that the heavy presence on the bridge communicated something hurtful and threatening to the 
public. Whereas working with locals to come up with strategies to reduce illegal border crossings 
might foster communication and united effort, placing U.S. Border Patrol enforcement personnel 
between Mexico and the U.S. told them, “this conversation only goes one way.” Within days, 
hundreds of people had joined a protest that “closed the Paso del Norte bridge and [they] 
confronted Border Patrol.”  Like other cities along the border between the United States and 4
Mexico, El Paso was home to a multi-ethnic population and was occupied by U.S. Border Patrol 
agents who often created a tense and disruptive atmosphere in their interactions with community 
members. However, the city, which in 1993 had a population of 561,842 residents , was the site 5
of a unique set of circumstances that led to the events of that day in September.  
In the years leading up to 1993, and likely for some time after, a number of El Paso’s 
residents filed lawsuits and human rights violation claims against the Border Patrol. To assuage 
the public, the former ​Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)  replaced Chief Musegades, 6
3 I will use the term border crossers to refer to everyone who attempts to cross the U.S.–Mexico border, most frequently 
meaning migrants and refugees. 
4 Garcia, Maria. "Special Report Part 3: Operation Blockade Creates Tension, Leads to Illegal Crossings in Desert." 
KVIA. January 16, 2014. Accessed April 20, 2019. 
https://www.kvia.com/news/special-report-part-3-operation-blockade-creates-tension-leads-to-illegal-crossings-in-dese
rt/55670185.  
5 United States Census Bureau 
6 At the time, ​INS was in charge of border operations, but ceased to exist in 2003 as part of the post-9/11 government 
reorganization that included the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Customs and Border Protectio​n​ (CBP) 
are now responsible for the former INS’s responsibilities. 
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who was at that point steeped in notoriety, with Mexican-American Border Patrol agent Silvestre 
Reyes as chief of the El Paso sector.  Shortly after his assignment, Reyes introduced Operation 7
Blockade.  With the agency facing pressure from the public to limit their engagement with 8
locals, the main concern was removing the incentive for that engagement: the assumption that 
there was a large population of “illegals” in the city who resembled a significant portion of the 
“legal” population. Reyes’ plan would reduce that likelihood by keeping border crossers out in 
the first place. He also had to find a way to prevent the then-understaffed Border Patrol from 
chasing border crossers through the city and questioning residents on their immigration status, 
which created, and continued despite, problems like Murillo v. Musegades.  
Murillo v. Musegades was a court case in which Mexican-American high school students, 
graduates, and staff at Bowie High School in El Paso filed a lawsuit against the Border Patrol for 
what they considered to be discriminatory and abusive treatment. The story reached a broader 
audience than had other scandals surrounding Musegades, likely because the showdown was 
between one of the lowest-income neighborhoods in the country and the might of the U.S. 
Border Patrol. Musegades and multiple unnamed Border Patrol agents were accused and found 
guilty of discrimination based on accounts of unlawful search and seizure, failure to make people 
who they stopped or detained aware of their rights, discriminatory and abusive treatment of 
plaintiffs (“representative plaintiff”)  and excessive presence on and interference with the school 9
campus and surrounding area. Among the claims made in the affidavits were stories of physical 
7 There are twenty sectors along the U.S.-Mexico border. 
8 It was originally called Operation Blockade. Weeks after its implementation and backlash it was changed to 
“Operation Hold The Line” in an attempt to improve public perception, however I will continue to refer to it as 
Operation Blockade to avoid confusion. 
9 The plaintiffs in the case represented other individuals “similarly situated”: ie. of Hispanic descent who worked, went 
to school, or resided and/or travelled in the Bowie High School school district. 
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and verbal abuse; pointing a gun at the head of a coach driving several students to a game; 
evidence of individual agents repeatedly targeting the same student by stopping him regularly, 
sometimes weekly, and driving by his home while yelling profanities and spitting out the 
window at him; entering a locker room at the school; driving a patrol vehicle on campus curbs, 
grass, sidewalks and sports fields; using binoculars to watch flag girls practicing on campus; and 
interrogating and detaining for several hours students en route to school.  Statistics were not 10
available to supplement the case because Border Patrol did not keep track of the residents who 
they interacted with in the aforementioned capacity. The Bowie students and staff won their 
lawsuit and the court order required Border Patrol to cease the practice of targeting people based 
on the color of their skin.  
Reyes 
As a border control strategy, prevention through deterrence (PTD) was born in McAllen, 
Texas and grew up in El Paso. It was a combination of acute circumstances and a 
military-veteran-turned-Border-Patrol agent’s creative problem-solving abilities. Different 
sources tell different accounts of Reyes: that he was a visionary who single-handedly 
revolutionized border security, that he left his superiors in the lurch, or that he was self-serving 
and only cared about his sector knowing that implementing his strategy would put pressure on 
other areas of the border where blockades were not being used. Others knew him casually as 
“that fella in El Paso who figured it out.” When he was stationed in McAllen, Texas, Reyes 
noticed large numbers of people hopping the border and Border Patrol ineffectively chasing after 
10 “​Murillo v. Musegades, 809 F. Supp. 487.”​ ​Justia US Law.  ​Dec. 4, 1992. Accessed April 29, 2019. 
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/809/487/1455969/ 
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them, and thought, “what if we stop them before they get here?” Insufficient funding and 
personnel to constantly station hundreds of officers along the border caused the operation to shut 
down a few weeks after its implementation, but Reyes was given a second chance in El Paso.  
Reyes’ plan was to place guards along densely populated areas of the border in something 
between a show of force reminiscent of pre-war military operations and a police car stationed at 
a busy interstate. The move was widely criticised by people who were paramilitary-minded for 
putting agents in high-visibility areas where they were more vulnerable to attacks, and by people 
who were from a human rights background/perspective for deterring at-risk border crossers from 
accessing populated areas with resources and pushing them out into dangerous terrain. 
Sometimes the two arguments converged, as in the case of the former INS district director, who 
had overseen the launch of Operation Blockade, Mark Reed’s comments to the LA Times. Reed 
said of the change, “‘​What we did is we took away safe passage and it became more difficult to 
get across. Instead of taking a bus to the border, it cost a lot of money and you paid a smuggler... 
Instead of a single man making his way up, now you brought the whole family up and you 
stayed. That didn’t work out too well for us. Now we really created a mess.’”  The message the 11
blockade sent was also a mess, as Larry Francis, who was the mayor of El Paso in 1993, pointed 
out, “‘... people in Mexico weren’t sure that we weren’t telling them ‘none of you are welcome.’”
 INS supported the plan despite criticism, taking the new numbers coming out of El Paso to 12
mean it was a success. If it had been implemented fully all along the border at the start, it might 
11 Carcamo, Cindy. “Border wall built in 1990s cut illegal immigration, but it also brought problems for small town.” 
L.A. Times. ​March 9, 2018. 
https://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-jacumba-border-fence-20180309-htmlstory.html 
12  Garcia, Maria. "Special Report Part 3: Operation Blockade Creates Tension, Leads to Illegal Crossings in Desert." 
KVIA. January 16, 2014. Accessed April 20, 2019. 
https://www.kvia.com/news/special-report-part-3-operation-blockade-creates-tension-leads-to-illegal-crossings-in-dese
rt/55670185​.  
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have made a difference overall, but as it stood Operation Blockade turned out to be a slap in the 
face to everyone south of the border who thought they were part of a multinational community, 
and something to scoff at for many of the people who regularly crossed the border in the area. 
There were fewer arrests in the city, but they had simply moved the problem laterally. In reality, 
border crossers, “many of whom were locals from Ciudad Juarez simply commuting to work in 
Texas, went to the edge of town where the fence magically disappeared and agents were few and 
far between.”  Other sectors along the border soon adopted similar strategies and the miracle 13
solution in El Paso became national strategy. 
Jason De León is a joint faculty member in the ​Department of Anthropology and Chicana/o 
Studies at UCLA ​.  In ​The Land of Open Graves: Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail​, he 14
attempts to bring us closer to “the realness” of the deaths and disappearances of border crossers. 
He argues that Operation Blockade was not a success for “public relations,” as Jason De Le​ón 
argued, but it was considered a success for Border Patrol. Apprehensions declined in El Paso, but 
it did not improve relations between U.S. and Mexican nationals. Dr. Josiah Heyman Dr. 
Heyman, director of the Center for InterAmerican and Border Studies at the University of Texas 
at El Paso (UTEP), has written on topics of immigration and border politics ranging from 
corruption among the ranks of immigration enforcement agencies like CBP and ICE to what a 
completely new system of border enforcement would look like. Dr. Heyman called Operation 
Blockade, “‘a tactical success but a strategic failure... It strategically just shifted them into desert 
areas, mountain areas, and into the hands of smugglers.’”  Funneling border crossers into 15
13 De León p. 6. 
14 De León, Jason. “Faculty profile.” ​UCLA Anthropology. ​2019.  https://anthro.ucla.edu/faculty/jason-de-león 
https://anthro.ucla.edu/faculty/jason-de-león 
15  Garcia, Maria. "Special Report Part 3: Operation Blockade Creates Tension, Leads to Illegal Crossings in Desert." 
KVIA. January 16, 2014. Accessed April 20, 2019. 
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vulnerable positions is a key element of PTD and will be discussed in detail below, but is not the 
only tactic in the Border Patrol’s new strategic toolkit.  
DTD 
It can be difficult to distinguish what is and is not deterrence. Immigration strategy 
includes deterrence, but not exclusively. Methods of controlling immigration include 
impermeable barriers, quotas, and raids and round-ups. These methods do without saying. They 
make it impossible for immigrants to enter or stay in the country. Deterrence policies can look 
similar, but instead say, “Don’t do it, it won’t end well.” The cornerstones of PTD are 
communication and manipulation. An acronym to help remember what deterrence is is DTD. 
The latter Ds stand for dissemination, desolation, deprivation, and detention. CBP disseminates 
information to the public south of the border, Border Patrol creates conditions in order to isolate 
(desolate) and deprive  border crossers, and through detention creates conditions for surrender. 16
PTD says, “If you choose to do this thing that we have intentionally made more difficult, you 
and the people you love might suffer.” To that end, programs like BORSTAR, the Border Patrol 
Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit,   created in 1998 in response to the growing number of 17
injuries to Border Patrol agents and migrant deaths along the borders,”  which trains border 18
https://www.kvia.com/news/special-report-part-3-operation-blockade-creates-tension-leads-to-illegal-crossings-in-dese
rt/55670185.  
 
16 Of life-sustaining resources. 
17 “​BORSTAR provides specialized law enforcement, search and rescue response from conventional to high-risk Border Patrol 
Operations, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) mission assignments, national search and rescue operations, 
national special security events and specialized training support directed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for 
both domestic and foreign government agencies.” Located in El Paso, Texas. Created in 1998. 
18 U.S. Customs and Border Protection. “Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue (BORSTAR).” ​Department of 
Homeland Security.​ March 2014. 
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Border%20Patrol%20Search%2C%20Trauma%2C%20and%20Resc
ue.pdf 
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agents in first aid and advanced search and rescue techniques, feels out of place. It makes more 
sense when you learn that it is “the only national law enforcement search and rescue entity with 
the capability to conduct tactical medical, search and rescue training for Federal, state, local and 
international government agencies.”  It serves PTD for people to die and go missing in the 19
desert, or drown in the Rio Grande, for families to mourn, for women to be raped and assaulted. 
The tragedy of their remains and in their testimonies are useful.  
The flaw in the system is that they are only mimicking the factors that make people 
attempt to cross the border in the first place. The short list of ongoing threats to Latin American 
nationals is: femicide, extortion, gang violence, forced gang activity, sexual assault and rape, 
domestic violence, and environmental disasters, all of which are incentives to attempt to migrate 
to or seek asylum in another country. Survivors often choose the U.S. after exhausting other 
options.  20
PTD looks like a wall that extends the length of a metropolitan area and out into a 
sparsely or unpopulated area, then stops. It is meant to manipulate crossings by “funneling” 
people into dangerous regions in which they are likely to suffer harm, ostensibly in the hope that 
they decide to turn back. It looks like media campaigns telling people about what people who do 
follow that wall until it ends unceremoniously in the middle of the desert and leaves them there. 
The wall does what border patrol cannot be seen doing: pick up potential border crossers, drop 
them off in the middle of nowhere, and drive away. It looks like family separation.While 
deportations have been tearing families apart for decades, they most often target people already 
situated in the U.S. and often result in the deported individual attempting re-entry to reunite with 
19 U.S. Customs and Border Protection. “Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue (BORSTAR).” 
20 People who suffer violence or threats of violence often attempt to hide in another country or another part of their 
home country, and only leave when they are detected. UNHCR report. 
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family still in the U.S. Family separation is has a different aim, more in line with deterrence 
through detention. It happens mainly to people who were only recently apprehended while or 
after crossing the border. The alleged goal is to enforce pre-existing laws by detaining border 
crossers until their court date, and follows a trend from George W. Bush’s presidency that saw 
assembly line court cases in which a judge would try multiple defendants at once. 
Dissemination 
Blockades are not the only form of deterrence the U.S. uses. Another strategy borrowed 
from wartime is government-funded propaganda. There have been two key years for 
dissemination, 2009 and 2014.  
In 2009, Pablo Izquierdo, “who runs the advertising agency in Washington that produced 
the ads... produced several ​Migracorridos ​, or ‘immigration ballads.’”  Under former 21
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Gil Kerlikowske, the CBP 
launched the “Dangers Awareness Campaign” in 2014. They funded the production of songs, 
ads, and billboards to be aired and posted in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico.  22
The purpose of the million-dollar mixed media project was to disseminate information in Central 
America about the dangers of attempting to cross the border using illegal methods, including 
coyotes and trains, in the hopes of deterring people, “especially families with children,” from 
attempting the journey to the U.S.  The composition and the lyrics are at odds. An upbeat song 23
21 Hamilton, Valerie. “How the US is trying to deter migrants from Central America - with music.” ​Public Radio 
International.​ July 17, 2014, 10:45 p.m. EDT. Accessed April 20, 2019.  
22 Hamilton, Valerie. “How the US is trying to deter migrants from Central America - with music.” ​Public Radio 
International.​ July 17, 2014, 10:45 p.m. EDT. Accessed April 20, 2019. 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-07-17/how-marimba-beat-helping-us-border-patrol-deter-migrants-coming-border 
23 Ibid 
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features the l​yrics, “‘​La Bestia del sur le llama, maldito tren de la muerte​,’ which translates to, 
‘They call it The Beast, damn train of death.’” The campaigns have not had the effect they were 
expected to. Doris Meissner, former commissioner for INS, stated, “‘The research that we do 
know about is that people are very aware of the dangers, but they make the decision to try.’” 
The media campaign is evidence that the Border Patrol was committed to communicating 
with potential border crossers. They were not laying a trap and seeking out victims. They 
genuinely wanted to ebb the flow of border crossers. It is the least harmful of the deterrence 
tactics. That being said, if it had worked, it would have convinced people to stay in one 
dangerous situation rather than enter another dangerous situation. Its harmlessness is mostly due 
to its inefficacy. ​Considering how heavily the U.S. relies on deterrence on its southern border, its 
implementation methods are shoddy. Deterrence is, as I will argue later, the only true deterrence 
strategy in PTD, and it is not even included in the policy that references the other tactics. In 
addition to million-dollar media campaigns are signs like the tiny one De León noticed “on the 
wall of the men’s bathroom [of the Juan Bosco migrant shelter in Nogales] that had been 
produced by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. In spanish the flier warned, ‘The next 
time you try to cross the border without documents you could end up a victim of the desert.’ This 
line was accompanied by a pathetic cartoon drawing of a cactus.”  De León follows his 24
description with two shrewd observations. First, it was one of the few times he had seen “a 
warning sign produced by the U.S. government in a Mexican shelter.” Second, “the wording of 
the pamphlet personified the desert as a perpetrator of violence targeting migrants.”  This point 25
is seen again and again in policy, which I will also go into in a later section.  
24 De León, Jason, Land of Open Graves, Introduction. p 29. 
25 Ibid. 
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Unfortunately, issuing cryptic warnings is not the only tactic Border Patrol employs. 
Their treatment of people who do not heed those warnings shatters the confidence the 
non-aggressive tactic inspires. 
Desolation and Deprivation 
Desolation and deprivation are the most actively harmful tactics. They force us to 
consider whether, on either an institutional or an individual level, Border Patrol prefers that 
border crossers die rather than enter the U.S. The remains of missing persons are sometimes and 
sometimes not uncovered intentionally by police and volunteers, or unintentionally by 
passers-by; the persons to whom they belonged are thought to have been funneled into the desert 
by Border Patrol through PTD. What is clear is that on an institutional level, the language 
distances Border Patrol from deaths resulting from their tactics, and they use that distance to 
absolve themselves of responsibility, possibly even of personal guilt. To understand these two 
tactics, we need to be familiar with the environment of the borderlands. 
The border between the U.S. and Mexico exten​ds 1,951 miles east to west.  Where the 26
U.S. meets Mexico, California borders Baja California, Arizona borders Sonora, New Mexico 
borders Chihuahua, and Texas borders Chihuahua, Coahuila, Tamaulipas, and a very small 
portion of Nuevo León. These regions make up the Borderlands. Elapsing state boundaries are 
vast stretches of desert, and topographical features such as mountains and rivers that overlay the 
borders on the map. The Sonoran Desert covers ​100,387 square miles of arid land in 
“southwestern Arizona and southeastern California, U.S., and including much of the Mexican 
26 Bush, George W. “Quick Facts About the U.S.-Mexican Border.” ​The White House. 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/usmxborder/quickfacts.html 
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state of Baja California Sur, part of Baja California state, and the western half of the state of 
Sonora.” Traversing the desert is dangerous for many reasons. Temperatures during the day can 
surpass 100 degrees Fahrenheit.  Among its population of harmless inhabitants are predatory 27
and poisonous animals including mountain lions, coyotes, tarantulas, scorpions, lizards and 
snakes.  Even people who intentionally venture into the desert for short trips, prepared for the 28
harsh conditions they might face, they are still at the mercy of the elements. When De ​León​ went 
with a group and a guide into the desert to recover remains, he described the relentless heat and 
sun exposure that left him with blisters covering every inch of exposed skin. ​Within the Sonoran 
Desert alone there are ample opportunities for harm without ever coming into contact with 
another person. That is its strength. It allows Border Patrol to stop border crossers without direct 
contact. By as early as 1926, Border Patrol acknowledged the environment’s power to derail 
border crossing efforts, but even then it was not an entirely new concept. Both De León and 
Martinez cite the 1886 Chinese Exclusion Acts as the first mention of the benefits of 
environmental in border-related policy. ​De León also addresses the connection between these 
earlier strategies and the Border Patrol’s strategy in the 1990s, “As one federal agent testified in 
1926, the goal of border enforcement was to ‘at least make attempts to cross the border 
dangerous and hold illegal entry down to small proportions.’”  ​Deadly terrain as an ally of the 29
state is addressed in “1994 and Beyond” and was taken further with walls and fencing 
throughout the early 2000s with more extensive barrier wall and fence building projects. Steps 
toward aggressive methods of PTD included increasing train speeds. Oscar Martinez, author of 
27 National Park Service. “Sonoran Desert Network Ecosystems.” ​NPS. ​Last updated Nov. 7, 2018. 
https://www.nps.gov/im/sodn/ecosystems.htm 
28 ​The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica​. “Sonoran Desert.” ​Encyclopedia Brittanica. ​Accessed April 20, 2019. 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Sonoran-Desert 
29 De León p. 32. 
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The Beast​, wrote about “La Bestia,” a cargo train that runs north through Mexico and until 
recently was a popular method of transportation for border crossers.  ​Personification of land 
along the border is crucial because it reveals that the U.S. sought an ally to combat border 
crossings. The source below, taken from a 1997 Government Accountability Office report on 
immigration reveals that crossings and crossers are one and the same: 
 
Desolation might sound like a minor effort compared to deprivation, which manifests as 
starvation, thirst, and death or injury from treatable injuries or illnesses. However, it is an 
essential part of PTD in its own right, and adds an element of contradiction that surpasses 
ignorance and ventures into sinister territory. By that I mean it is entirely possible that the people 
responsible for the genesis of PTD in the mid-1990s believed it would be effective. Their 

21 
methods of shows of force and dissemination campaigns followed the general model of 
deterrence: fear of apprehension equals fewer attempted crossings. Constructing a wall that 
abruptly ends in the middle of a desert for no legitimate purpose, like ones that skip over roads, 
rivers, and property lines, does not send a message to anyone except the person who is trying to 
cross it. It is not a warning, it is a redirecting tactic that has been proven effective only in causing 
the deaths and disappearances of thousands of people since its construction.  
“​[T]he USBP began erecting a barrier known as the ‘primary fence’ directly on the border in 
1990 to deter illegal entries and drug smuggling in its San Diego sector.​ ​The San Diego fence formed 
part of the USBP’s ‘Prevention Through Deterrence’ strategy,​ ​which called for reducing unauthorized 
migration by placing agents and resources directly on the border along population centers in order to 
deter would-be migrants from entering the country. The San Diego primary fence was completed in 
1993, covering the first 14 miles of the border from the Pacific Ocean. The fence was constructed of 
10-foot-high welded steel army surplus landing mats ​ ​with the assistance of the Corps of Engineers and 
the California National Guard. In addition to the 14 miles of primary fencing erected in its San Diego 
sector, the USBP maintains stretches of primary fencing in several other sectors along the southwest 
border, including Campo, CA; Yuma, AZ; Nogales, AZ; Naco, AZ; Douglas, AZ; and El Paso, TX.”  
Chase and Scatter 
“Chase and scatter” is a tactic in which the Border Patrol chases border crossers using 
whatever means have an access point, be it ATVs, helicopters, SUVs, or horses. Sometimes they 
have to follow on foot. They frequently employ dogs, guns, tasers, and battery equipment. The 
goal is to catch border crossers. The reality is scaring border crossers so that they act recklessly, 
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running too fast over rocky terrain, which greatly increases their risk of injury and death. The 
chase is often deadly.  30
Deprivation has perhaps the most startling effect because it is more often a result of 
desolation, which is the direct consequence of policy. We cannot draw a line from policy to 
deprivation without first establishing conditions for desolation. Border Patrol does not have a 
policy that directly causes deprivation, but it is implied that desolation will cause deprivation. 
The agency insists it does not condone abuse of border crossers, but the agency is made up of 
individuals who have evidently made it unofficial only in writing to do harm to border crossers. 
James Tomsheck, who was fired in 2014 from his position as Border Patrol internal affairs chief, 
depicted the agency as a corrupt group of individuals who had not been properly vetted, were 
highly corruptible, and neglected to hold each other accountable for misconduct.  31
Detention 
“They should help facilitate the asylum process so that one doesn't suffer in detention 
centers. They shouldn’t be causing more harm.” - Alexa from El Salvador  32
“It is better to be free and to die by a bullet than to suffer and die slowly in a cage.” 
-Anonymous Mexican woman  33
 
Detention is unpleasant at its best. Its worst depends on whom you ask. If you asked 
Connie, as Oscar Martinez did, she would tell you it was the “worst memory since she arrived” 
in Chiapas. She had been working in Huixtla at a dive when “migration”  detained her. She said 34
30 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2014/aug/13/-sp-border-crisis-texas-ranchers-brooks-county-smuggl
ers-deaths 
31 Johnson, Carrie. “Former Border Protection Insider Alleges Corruption.” NPR. Last updated August 28, 2014. 
https://www.npr.org/2014/08/28/343748572/former-border-protection-insider-alleges-corruption-distortion-in-agency 
32 ​UNHCR, Women on the Run Report ​(2015) p. 47, ​available at ​https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/56fc31864.pdf#zoom=95 
33 ​Ibid., ​p. 47. 
34 Border Patrol 

23 
of the experience, “‘They put me in prison. I was so nervous I got sick. I got depressed. I’d never 
been in a place like that, with so many people crammed together. I was the only woman in the 
cell. There were so many men. And I got harassed all the time. The guy in charge of the 
migration unit told me that if I slept with him, he’d let me go.’”  ​Due to the recent changes in 35
detention procedures, even for people who have not heard about the men who harassed Connie in 
prison, it is becoming increasingly difficult to believe that Border Patrol cares about the 
wellbeing of border crossers. For border crossers, that has always been the case. Institutional 
distrust is prevalent in Mexico. Many of the stories Martinez recounts in his book mention that 
the police were working with traffickers and kidnappers. Smugglers lie about what will happen 
to people. They lie to parents. A woman desperate to hear from her son who smugglers claimed 
they had left on a cattle farm, called Alba Caceres, a Guatemalan consul. Caceres first reached 
out to Border Patrol, but they could not locate him. She broke protocol and went to the address 
the smugglers had given the mother, but it did not match.  The truth is vital to women’s survival 36
in the Borderlands. If Border Patrol is adding lies on top of the pile, they become untrustworthy 
and border crossers avoid them. The recent family separation policy is a huge blow to the Border 
Patrol’s credibility. Lying within an already insecure situation has ruined perhaps forever any 
relationhsip the Border Patrol could have had with border crossers. The lies include Border 
Patrol agents telling parents their child will meet them at the airport, and when the agents fail to 
bring the child, the agents convince the family member(s) to board the plane anyway because a 
separate plane for minors will be coming soon. Parents have arrived in Central America to 
35 Martinez, p. 84. 
36 Guardian US Interactive Team, Melissa Del Bosque, and The Texas Observer. "A Cemetary for Our People." The 
Guardian. Accessed April 02, 2019. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2014/aug/20/-sp-cemetery-for-our-people-guatemalan-consul-texas-
migrant-crisis 
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discover that Border Patrol has not released their child from custody. Updated media coverage 
says, “Reuniting migrant families might be too hard,” as if not doing so is an option. Parents 
have been tricked into signing custody waivers. In 2018, Trump decided he would allow Border 
Patrol to reunite families they had separated, but only if the families agreed to “voluntary” 
deportation, waiving their claims to asylum and abandoning their hope of staying in the U.S.  37
Migrant families have been separated by multiple means, including deportation and 
detention, but the simultaneous administrative officality and disorganization and negligence of 
the Trump-era policy have created a humanitarian crisis ​within​ the U.S. Scale and location are 
clearly important when it comes to triggering rage and empathic responses from the U.S. public. 
Hearing about a father who was deported after receiving a DUI and could not go to AA because 
it was during his shift at work is heartbreaking. Finding out the government has been physically 
tearing children away from their parents by the thousands is horrifying. Knowing that they are 
being held in facilities within the U.S. is humiliating. But they are still on the border. The 
majority of the “tender-age shelters” -- converted warehouses and grocery stores where Border 
Patrol is holding children ages five and under -- are in border states.  
The UNHCR report, ​Women on the Run,​ includes case studies of 160 women  from the 38
NTCA (Northern Triangle of Central America), which includes El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras, and from Mexico, traveling through and within Mexico to seek asylum.  The report 39
effectively allies their voices and narratives with logistical language to support the UNHCR's 
argument for proposed updated policy. The recommendations section includes a text block titled, 
37 Lind, Dara. "Trump's "reunification" Plan Offers Separated Families an Impossibly Cruel Choice." Vox. June 25, 
2018. Accessed April 20, 2019. 
https://www.vox.com/2018/6/25/17484042/children-parents-separate-reunite-plan-trump. 
38 ​Including transgender women. 
39 ​UNHCR, Women on the Run Report ​(2015) p. 2. 
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“What Women Would Say to Governments” with quotes from Salvadoran, Honduran, 
Guatemalan, and Mexican women. The report also injects the main body of text with statements 
from the women in the study, providing not only color and context, but also providing valuable 
intelligence. For someone investigating gang violence, the following statement by Nelly, a young 
Honduran woman, would provide valuable insight into how gangs and criminal armed groups 
operate: 
 
“‘The gangs treat women much worse than men. They want us to join as members, but 
then women are also threatened to be gang members’ ‘girlfriends,’ and it’s never just sex 
with that one; it’s forced sex with all of them. Women are raped by them, tortured by 
them, abused by them.’”  40
 
Detention has always presented unique challenges for women, namely administrative 
obstacles. Some women did not view detention as an uncrossable border, “particularly those who 
had been quickly released from immigration detention.”  For most of the women who 41
participated in the study, however, detention was just as bad as or worse than the obstacles they 
had faced up to that point. “The most problematic aspect of flight and accessing asylum, as 
identified by the women themselves, was detention (in both the United States and Mexico).”  42
There are two particularly strenuous aspects of detention as reported by the participants: 
psychological trauma and legal proceedings. Some women “were held in facilities with their 
children, including very young children, and described wanting to abandon their claims so that 
40 ​Ibid., ​p. 16. 
41 ​Ibid., p.  
42 ​UNHCR, Women on the Run Report ​(2015) p. 43. 
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their sons or daughters would be able to leave detention.”  Detention left lasting marks. One 42
Salvadoran woman said, “‘The things I lived through in detention have marked me for life [...] 
Please remember that we are also human beings. I didn’t want to come here, but for me it was a 
question of life and death.’”  That women who have lived through almost every form of 43
violence imaginable consider giving up once in detention shows the emotional depths to which 
detention can drive women.  
Legal representation is “‘the single most important factor in determining outcome’”  of 44
individual asylum cases. Without legal representation, it is often impossible to “fully understand 
the proceedings, file the correct paperwork in a language they do not understand, or gather 
evidence.” People who do not speak English cannot fill out paperwork in English without a 
translator. Translators and attorneys are necessary, but being in detention makes it difficult to 
find one due to “lack of resources and distance from major service providers.”  “A significant 45
number of women reported being” kidnapped and held for ransom in Mexico. “Some women 
went into significant debt to family members who paid [the ransom], leaving them without 
resources to pay bond or hire lawyers once they reached the United States and were detained 
there.”  Women detained in Mexico and in the U.S. reported being denied asylum on the basis 46
of not having proof of their claims, even though the countries they are coming from are so 
violent that it is actually statistically less likely that they would not be at risk for violence. 
Several countries in the NTCA have the highest rates of femicide in Latin America. “[...] the list 
of femicides is led by Brazil (with 1,133 victims confirmed in 2017). [...] if the rate per every 
42 ​Ibid., ​p. 47. 
43 ​Ibid.​, p. 47. 
44 ​Ibid., ​p. 47. From “a recent academic study [that] looked at asylum cases from Central America.” 
45Ibid., ​p. 47. 
46 ​Ibid., ​p. 45. 
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100,000 women is compared, the phenomenon has a scope in El Salvador that is seen nowhere 
else in the region: 10.2 femicides for every 100,000 women. In 2016, Honduras recorded 5.8 
femicides for every 100,000 women. In Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Bolivia, high 
rates were also seen in 2017, equal to or above 2 cases for every 100,000 women.” These 
numbers only include reported homicides. The actual number of femicide victims is unknown. 
According to global data collected by the World Health Organization (WHO), “​Almost one third 
(30%) of all women who have been in a relationship have experienced physical and/or sexual 
violence by their intimate partner.”  ​The UNHCR report interviewed 160 women. A woman 48
detained in the U.S. reported that authorities told her she “did not have the right to anything 
because I had been deported already.”  Entering the U.S. illegally is a misdemeanor under 49
current U.S. law. She could have been charged with felony re-entry at the time. Human 
traffickers and drug smugglers manipulate the law as one of many means of entrapment. By 
eliminating the women’s ability to go to the authorities by forcing them to participate in illegal 
activity, traffickers can hold and abuse them without fear of repercussion. 
The Trump administration amplified its harshest aspects of detention when it enacted the 
“zero-tolerance policy,” also known as the family separation policy. The policy was meant to end 
“catch and release,” a Bush-era policy that released apprehended border crossers and assigned 
them court dates. The practice was criticised for giving apprehended border crossers too much 
leniency, allowing them to “slip away” before they were to appear in court.  However, most 50
48 ​"Violence against Women." World Health Organization. November 29, 2017. Accessed January 20, 2019. 
https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/violence-against-women. 
49 ​Ibid., ​p. 47. 
50 Rhetoric used by both conservative and liberal media:  
https://www.washingtonpost.com  
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people were not given the opportunity to leave detention in the interim. The exceptions were 
mostly adults traveling with minors. Catch and release has been heavily criticised by the current 
administration. A statement released by the White House on April 2, 2018 criticized catch and 
release practices. They claimed that they are the result of “statutory and judicial obstacles,” 
including a federal exception for “UACs” (Unaccompanied Alien Children) from 
“non-contiguous countries” including El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras “from being 
promptly returned to their home countries. This results in nationals from these and other 
countries entering and never leaving.” The statement lists statistics on how many of the “UACs" 
and “Family Units” who enter are apprehended, and how many are not, but includes no mention 
of homicide rates in the sending countries. Asylum is not the message the U.S. wants to send to 
potential border crossers. They express the concern that, " ​Foreign nationals see how easy it is to 
enter the United States, and how hard it is for federal immigration authorities to remove aliens 
who enter illegally, and are accordingly drawn to the United States. In the absence of lasting 
solutions to the problems that riddle our immigration system, we can only expect the flow of 
illegal immigration into our country to continue."  In lieu of a lasting solution, the 51
administration decided to implement an advanced deterrence strategy.  
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s-to-fill-by-bart-stinson/,  
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Insurrection.​ April 1, 2018. 
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When the policy was enacted, Border Patrol began separating minors from the family or 
caretakers they traveled with and placed them in separate detention facilities. A report detailed in 
the New York Times in February revealed new and horrifying information about Border Patrol’s 
actions within those detention facilities. Minors in detention facilities during that time reported 
being sexual assaulted by staff and other minors while in custody. Of the “1,303 cases deemed 
the most serious, 178 claims were against staff members, and “the rest” were against other 
minors. “From October 2014 to July 2018, the Office of Refugee Resettlement, a part of the 
Health and Human Services Department that cares for so-called unaccompanied minors, received 
a total of 4,556 allegations of sexual abuse or sexual harassment, 1,303 of which were referred to 
the Justice Department.”  52
Chapter 2: Policy and Language 
1994 and Beyond 
Reyes’ strategy​ was “adopted in Southern California (‘Operation Gatekeeper’ in 1994), 
Arizona (‘Operation Safeguard’ in 1994 and 1999), and South Texas (‘Operation Rio Grande’ in 
52 Haag, Matthew. “Thousands of Immigrant Children Said They Were Sexually Abused in U.S. Detention Centers, 
Report Says.” ​The New York Times. ​Feb. 27, 2019. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/us/immigrant-children-sexual-abuse.html?fbclid=IwAR0Pun0Cd9TjxMx_YT4L
3BX60cmE71penNrgHV7-WTQ-98VafhH0CvQr_p8 
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The document lays out a plan in four phases with the goal of expanding PTD operation to 
other parts of the border. Phase I focuses on control of San Diego and El Paso Corridors, Phase II 
on South Texas and Tucson corridors, Phase III on the remainder of the southwest border, and 
Phase IV on control of “All the United States Borders/Adjust to Flow (All AAs), effectively 
gaining control of the border incrementally from west to east. In Phase I we see the immediate 
impact of Operation Blockade. The priority for the first phase was to gain control of urban 
centers in order to prevent “illegal entrants [from being able to] assimilate with the population, 
making it difficult for the Border Patrol to quickly identify and arrest individual illegal entrants.” 
This was the problem in El Paso, which they stretched to include San Diego, another 
metropolitan area. It is clear they perceived Operation Blockade as at least a marginal success in 
El Paso, “When the Border Patrol controls the urban areas, the illegal traffic is forced to use the 
rural roads which offer less anonymity and accessibility to public transportation.”  55
Phase II predicts a shift in “illegal traffic” to the South Texas and Tucson corridors (AA3 
and AA4) from AA1 and AA2 as a result of the previous phase. Here again, the focus is on urban 
centers. Elements of Phase II include determining whether Phase I was successful, highlighting 
the newness of the plan and revealing at least some possible misgivings. It includes concerning 
details as well. They anticipated that markers of success would be “fee increase by smugglers,” 
“fewer illegal immigrants in the interior of the U.S.,” and “reduction in use of social services and 
53 De León p. 31. 
54 “Border Patrol Strategic Plan 1994 and Beyond: National Strategy”, July, 1994. 
55 ​Ibid​. 
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benefits in the U.S.”  They acknowledge a connection between their policy and the criminal 56
activity (smugglers), but border crossers who have to pay the smugglers are not mentioned, again 
revealing their inconsistent concern for border crossers. Then their main goal is addressed: keep 
“illegal immigrants” out of the U.S. and prevent them from using social services.  57
Phase III was set to happen “only after valid indicators of success and changed conditions 
reflect border control has been attained in the Phase II main effort.”  It introduces considerations 58
for shifts occurring within the U.S. and offshore as the plan pulls the attention of U.S. employers 
and higher levels of government. Some indicators of success are, “increased seacoast entries,” 
“political pressure to loosen the border,” “inquiries from U.S. employers of undocumented 
workers,” “improved public perception,” and “fewer aliens staging in Mexico.”  Changed 59
conditions include, “air/sea entry attempts increase,” “change in smugglers tactics,” “Mexico 
will enhance border control of their Southern border (OTM’s who until now had entered their 
country, traversed, and then crossed the U.S. border will be forced to stay in Mexico),” “pressure 
for another ‘Bracero program’ (temporary worker program),” and “economic changes in U.S.”   60
Finally, Phase IV ends in a culmination of the “indicators of success” and “changed 
conditions” seen in Phases I through III, the concern being that those forms of resistance will 
pressure the Border Patrol into backtracking and losing ground. Phase IV is mainly a summary of 
the first three phases. It is not the priority, otherwise the remaining regions of the border, which 
Phase IV focuses on controlling, would have been mentioned earlier. The costs of the policy’s 
progress include “reduction in the cheap labor force” and special interest groups putting more 
56 Ibid., p. 10. 
57 Subtext: “social services meant for legal residents” 
58 ​Ibid​., p. 11. 
59 Ibid. p. 11-12. 
60 Ibid. p. 12. 
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has been unsuccessful. There are human factors to consider, that they do consider and warn 
against, but regard them only as potential future pressures. They almost completely disregard the 
incentives driving people to attempt entry. They acknowledge that “[t]he most desperate of those 
aliens seeking entry will [still] attempt illegal entry,” but their scale for measuring desperation 
does not take into account the scope and longevity of the humanitarian crises occurring in Latin 
America. 
Another very important detail is the differentiation between deterrence and re-routing. In 
the description of Phase I they write: 
 
“As the strategy in San Diego and El Paso (main effort areas) becomes more effective, 
much of the flow of illegal traffic will shift to other avenues of approach that transform 
from supporting areas to main effort areas. Some part of the flow will turn to other entry 
tactics, including legal entry, use of fraudulent documents, and requests for asylum and 
immigration hearings. Some part of the flow will be deterred from attempting illegal 
entry.”  62
 
The “other” entry tactics all involve engagement with Border Patrol or other border 
enforcement entities, which implies that illegal crossings avoid official and willing interaction 
with Border Patrol. 
61 1994 and Beyond, p. 12. 
62 Strategy 1994 and Beyond p. 9. 
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Nothing in the document indicates that the aim of the policy expansion is to cause injury 
to border crossers. One of the “measures of effectiveness” for Phase I is, “reduction of serious 
accidents involving aliens on highways, trains, drowning, dehydration (main effort).” They are 
seemingly sympathetic to and committed to the wellbeing of border crossers, but the conditions 
that are necessary for making the strategy work (including hostile terrain and fear of 
apprehension) hinder their ability to fully commit to protecting the people their policy affects. At 
times their awareness of this contradiction peeks through. Although they at no point make the 
connection between injury to border crossers and their policy, they do make one between an 
unspecified form of violence and the policy, “Violence will increase as effects of strategy are 
felt.” This line could be used to account for injury to border crossers by Border Patrol or by the 
environment; increase in violent activity such as assaults, rapes, and robbery as the policy pushes 
assailants out of cities and into more rural areas where law enforcement presence is minimal or 
nonexistent. I do not think it means any of those things. Based on the context and the fact that 
they never admit to any of the other forms of violence in the document, it can reasonably be 
taken to mean violence like Border Patrol faced in El Paso during the early days of Operation 
Blockade: backlash from Mexican nationals. At each phase, they account for this type of 
resistance, as well as resistance on other fronts. Indicators of success for the four phases include, 
“possible increase in complaints (Mexico, interest groups, etc.),”  “increase in complaints 63
(Mexico, interests groups, etc.),”  “political pressure to loosen border,”  “potential for more 64 65
protests against immigration policy,”  “more violence at attempted entries.”  Furthermore, the 66 67
63 1994 and Beyond, p. 9. 
64 1994 and Beyond, p. 10. 
65 1994 and Beyond, p. 11. 
66 1994 and Beyond, p. 12. 
67 1994 and Beyond, p. 12. 
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1997 report by the Government Accountability Office (GOA) differentiates between violence 
against border patrol and harm suffered by border crossers. The latter is not defined as 
“violence.”  68
The four-point plan demonstrates a desperate attempt at structure at a time when the 
Border Patrol was facing criticism for unruliness that led to harassment charges and the 
take-down of its sector chief. The desire for a cohesive, organized strategy led to an evolution of 
the Border Patrol that has remained the foundation of border operations for more than 
twenty-five years. The perception of the plan as incremental was challenged in 2001. 
September 11 and Beyond 
The September 11 terrorist attacks made 2001 a turning point for the U.S.’s national 
security apparatus, throwing the country into a period of shock, mourning, fear, and triggering a 
massive reorganization of government agencies. The post-9/11 era saw the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the beginning of the never-ending War On Terror (as 
in WOT are we doing?), and a surge in funding for border security initiatives. September 11 was 
also considered a turning point for border security. On the southern border all was not quiet, but 
the changes were not as institutionally dramatic as they were up north. Border Patrol did not go 
through an upheaval in the same way that Washington did. At its inception, the DHS 
consolidated twenty-two departments, one of which was U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP). The United States Border Patrol (USBP) is under the jurisdiction of CBP. USBP has been 
an agency since 1924 and its inclusion in DHS did little more than make it part of a formidable 
68 GAO Report to the Judiciary. https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/224958.pdf 
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control of its borders. September 11 did not change the southwest border as much as it prompted 
Washington to accelerate and fully embrace policy introduced or implemented before September 
11. A post-9/11 Border Patrol had more financial and moral support from Washington while 
remaining committed to the idea of holding the line. The result was a militarized  Border Patrol 69
with a combination of high- and low-tech -- drones and other surveillance technology, and 
personnel, respectively -- blockade, still facing south. The CBP itself had a different perception 
of this stage in its development. The 2004 Border Patrol Strategic Plan states, 
 
“In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Border Patrol has 
experienced a tremendous change in its mission. With the formation of a new parent 
agency, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Border Patrol has as its priority 
mission preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. The 
Border Patrol will continue to advance its traditional mission by preventing illegal aliens, 
smugglers, narcotics, and other contraband from entering the United States as these 
measures directly impact the safety and security of the United States... To carry out its 
missions, the Border Patrol has a clear strategic goal: to establish and maintain 
operational control of the border of the United States. All of our efforts must be focused 
on this goal.”  70
 
69 Positions filled with ex-military personnel, increased funding for military-grade surveillance technology. 
70 U.S. CBP 2004 Strategic Plan https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=457100 
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In one breath, USBP says it has a new mission and that they will achieve it by continuing 
to do what they have been doing. It is difficult to see where they draw the line between their 
“traditional mission” and their new “priority mission.” The statement about continuing to 
advance their traditional mission might simply be intended as reassurance that USBP will not 
abandon its responsibilities. On the next page it states that the strategic means of achieving the 
goal set forth by CBP will build upon the strategies outlined in its 1994 Strategic Plan.  
Whatever they thought was going to happen as a result of their inclusion in DHS, the 
result was an alliance between Border Patrol and Washington over an urgent national security 
agenda: counter terrorism. The response was proportionate to the psychological effect the attacks 
had had on the country, but the pressure was localized in an area already shaking under the 
weight of the enormous mission it had been assigned. To avoid overwhelming the border, 
Washington increased funding for personnel and equipment. Even this was not necessarily new. 
The United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which was dissolved in 2003, 
had gone through several budget increases before the 2000s. 
 
“INS’ overall budget has more than doubled within 5 years, from $1.5 billion in 
fiscal year 1993 to $3.1 billion in fiscal year 1997. INS has spent about $2.3 billion on 
border enforcement from fiscal years 1994 through 1997. For fiscal year 1997, the 
combined budget for INS’ Border Patrol and Inspections programs—the two programs 
responsible for deterring illegal entry along the border—was nearly $800 million. INS, 
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Over the next eight years they would acquire surveillance RPVs (remotely piloted 
vehicles) that would supplement manned surveillance methods. The government also assigned 
ex-military personnel to the border.   72
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can be used for combat (unmanned combat aerial 
vehicle, or UCAV) and surveillance.  On the border their purpose is the latter. The spike in 73
technological and unmanned warfare did not immediately translate to the southern border. As of 
2008, Border Patrol was still submitting requests for UAVs.  
In 1994, Border Patrol set up a course of action that they believed could lead to control of 
the southern border. The reality was messier than anticipated, initially due to inconsistent 
funding. The border drew from September 11 a sudden and relatively consistent entrance to 
political discourse. The new widespread public desire to secure the border meant politicians were 
able to use it as a show of their leadership capabilities. After years of uptakes in money going to 
border security, they still have not been able to follow through with the plan successfully. In 
terms of funding, there was a spike in 2001 and in 2006 when Bush signed the Secure Fence Act 
of 2006 (otherwise known as H.R. 6061).  but as there were (luckily) no attacks on the U.S. 74
71 GAO Report to the Judiciary.  ​https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/224958.pdf​ p. 5. 
72 There are two different types of UAVs: drones and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs). Both drones and RPVs are 
pilotless, but drones are programmed for autonomous flight. RPVs are actively flown—remotely—by a ground control 
operator. UAVs are defined as a powered aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces 
to provide lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry lethal or 
nonlethal payloads. 
73 Prior knowledge of UAVs. 
74  Bush, George W. “Fact Sheet: The Secure Fence Act of 2006.” ​The White House. 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061026-1.html 
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coming from south of the border that even came close to the scale and impact of September 11, 
PTD did not receive undivided organization attention. Immigration reform, however, did. Each 
administration since 1994 has interpreted PTD differently and woven elements of it into new or 
updated policy. During one of Obama’s many standstills with Congress,  he signed an executive 75
order that reinstated “catch-and-release” and prohibited Border Control from apprehending 
undocumented border crossers in response to the increase in unaccompanied minors crossing the 
border and the embarrassingly low attendance rate among border crossers who had orders to 
appear in court.  The order briefly challenged immigration law that said it was a misdemeanor 76
to enter the U.S. without proper documentation. Unsurprisingly, it was not received well. 
Brandon Judd, former president of the National Border Patrol Council, told Congress, “[T]he 
releases are part of President Obama’s ‘priorities’ program, which orders agents to worry chiefly 
about criminals, national security risks and illegal immigrants who came into the U.S. after Jan. 
1, 2014. ​Mr. Judd​ said illegal immigrants without serious criminal convictions have learned that 
by claiming they came before 2014 — without even needing to show proof — they can be 
released immediately rather than being arrested.”  The situation was also messy because 77
immigration involves human factors that can change unexpectedly. In 2014 alone there were  
The effects of policies inspired by Operation Blockade are not new. In the most recent of 
several evolutions, the current administration implemented policy that involved detaining 
families in separate facilities, or in separate sections in the same facility. Family separation is not 
75 Government shutdowns or refusal to act, both by Congress. 
76Dinan, Stephen. “Obama reinstates ‘catch-and-release’ policy for illegal immigrants.” ​The Washington Times. ​Feb. 4, 
2016. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/4/obama-reinstates-catch-and-release-policy-illegals/ 
77 Dinan, Stephen. "Obama Reinstates 'catch-and-release' Policy for Illegal Immigrants." The Washington Times. 
February 04, 2016. Accessed April 1, 2019. 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/4/obama-reinstates-catch-and-release-policy-illegals/ 
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new. Deportation has been standard operating procedure since people called it “banishment.” 
One time-stamped piece of evidence was a phenomenon known as “Mexican Repatriation” that 
occurred during and after the Great Depression (1929 to 1936) in which INS played a “complex” 
role.  In those years a staggering number of Mexican-Americans were forcibly (some willingly) 78
deported to Mexico. The numbers are still contested because the INS does not have records for 
“non-federally mandated departures,”  but based on multiple sources  it was likely around one 79 80
million. 
Chapter 3: Rhetoric 
 
“These aren’t people. These are animals.” 
- Donald Trump, referring to members of MS13  81
 
Above is a glimpse into the evolution of border security through the lens of deterrence. 
Now I turn to the language the underlies every significant factor in the story of PTD. Language is 
the most dangerous tool that Border Patrol and other entities wield to control their image and 
78“INS Records for 1930s Mexican Repatriation.” ​U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. ​March 3, 2014. 
https://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/our-history/historians-mailbox/ins-records-1930s-mexican-repatriations 
79 ibid. 
80 Articles from:  
Wagner, Alex. “America’s Forgotten History of Illegal Deportations.” ​The Atlantic. ​ March 6, 2017. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/americas-brutal-forgotten-history-of-illegal-deportations/517971/  
https://www.npr.org/2015/09/10/439114563/americas-forgotten-history-of-mexican-american-repatriation,  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2018/08/13/the-time-a-president-deported-1-million-mexican-americans-fo
r-stealing-u-s-jobs/?utm_term=.26a6274b71c0.  
81  Korte, Gregory and Alex Gomez. “Trump ramps up rhetoric on undocumented immigrants: These aren’t people. 
These are animals.”  ​USA Today.​ Last updated May 17, 2018. 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/05/16/trump-immigrants-animals-mexico-democrats-sanctuary-citi
es/617252002/ 
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justify their actions. Upon closer inspection, it is also clear that they have inadvertently used it to 
self-sabotage, partly because they do not know how to use it properly, but mostly because they 
had little intention of using PTD in a way that would protect border crossers, and the language 
that makes it possible for them to misuse deterrence is also what gives them away. 
The distance Border Patrol places between itself and border crosser injury and death sets 
an unsettling tone. Border Patrol is solely responsible for engaging with border crossers; so, how 
do they reason that they are not involved in the harm that comes to border crossers? They do it 
like that. “The harm that comes to border crossers” is a passive statement. “Harm” and “border 
crossers” are present, but “Border Patrol” is not. I have yet to find a statement that begins with 
“The harm Border Patrol inflicts” that does not end in some version of “on migrants and 
refugees,” indicating that it does not work the other way around. The victims must always be 
included in statements of violence, which is a linguistic victim-blaming tactic. If you leave out 
the victim, there is no violence. If you leave out the aggressor, there is still the victim. There is 
only the victim. The gap left by “Border Patrol” in these kinds of statements leaves room for 
other perpetrators. Most often, they use the environment as the scapegoat. In those cases it 
usually indicates desolation and deprivation. The fact that this rhetorical tactic was not exposed 
when landowners spoke out about the impact the new blockades had on their communities, nor 
when border crosser deaths rose abruptly after 1993, is a sign that it will likely be around for a 
long time. 
The rhetoric that I suspect will outlast even environmental personification is the language 
of detention. Sometimes the so-called perpetrator is even less human than heat, floods, animals, 
and jagged terrain. Sometimes it is a building. Writers for both liberal and conservative media 
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have been using passive language that distances Border Patrol from the facilities where they are 
detaining children and their families. Instead of saying, “Border Patrol is holding children ages 
five and under in what they call tender-age shelters,” they would say, “Children ages five and 
under are being sent to tender-age shelters,” or “The facilities house children ages five and 
under.” Border Patrol agents send border crossers to the detention facilities and guard them, but 
they are largely absent from descriptions of that process. Most of the statements resemble 
something like,“Persons caught crossing the border are sent to detention facilities.” This is an 
example of a problem I will explain soon: the absence of the offender in statements of violence. 
First, there is an important detail in the statement by the Border Patrol on their role after 
September 11. They group “illegal aliens” together with “narcotics, smugglers, and other 
contraband” and state that preventing these people and items from entering the United States 
“directly impact[s] the safety and security of the United States.” Overwhelming evidence has 
shown that the vast majority of people crossing the southwest border into the U.S. were 
survivors, not perpetrators, of terrorist-like gang and drug cartel violence. The list should 
differentiate between the people who are instigating the violence and the people who are not. 
This is one of the main pitfalls of PTD. On an institutional level, the agency responsible for 
acting out deterrence strategies has an inhuman and factually erroneous way of talking about 
border crossers. 
The ways in which we refer to border crossers matter. They inform political discussion. 
Discussion informs policy. Policy impacts border crossers. Some instances of questionable 
rhetoric are closely associated with Border Patrol activities. Sometimes it is covert. In a 
disturbing game of Border-Patrol-themed MASH, a detention facility located in McAllen, where 
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wagering their freedom against their ability to perform unreasonable tasks with restrictions that 
she set, and then intervening and sabotaging them. Ursula might be a rogue incident, but even 
official jargon used regularly in government documents is conspicuously insensitive and 
disrespectful. The shorthand for families is “Family Units,” abbreviated as “FUs,” also an 
acronym for “fuck you.” Any migrants from countries that are not Mexico are called “Other 
Than Mexicans” (OTM’S)]. The most obvious case of inappropriate language is both the most 
frequently used and the most public: “illegals.” It perfectly illustrates Border Patrol’s priorities 
by identifying border crossers as illicit subjects. It does not just describe them. It defined them, 
and subsequently endangers them. 
When we  accept the stereotypes that claim border crossers are criminals, that they steal 81
jobs from U.S. citizens, we are supporting that claim that they are a danger to U.S. citizens. 
Taken a step further, when we deem them threats to U.S. citizens, it justifies the claim that their 
existence within the U.S. is a danger to the state. That allowance makes it easier for us to accept 
dehumanizing rhetoric and excessive force as admissible. If we reduce people who are, or who 
we believe will be, in the U.S. illegally to “illegals,” then not only have we said that by crossing 
the border they committed a crime, but also that their existence within the U.S. is punishable. As 
Trump has done, claiming that a “migrant caravan” is an “invasion” makes the “illegals” that 
make up the group(s) enemies of the state and therefore a threat to the state’s sovereignty. As we 
know, former U.S. presidents have also deployed the national guard to the southern border. 
81 Non-border crossers. 
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However, although people in those years talked about border crossers using hateful language, I 
have not found evidence that a large number of people, or else a person in a significant position 
of power, called them invaders. Trump has changed that. 
Language of Violence 
From the perspective of the Border Patrol, one of the biggest challenges it currently faces 
is the rise in illegal border-crossings. Deterrence has been used by police, military, and 
lawmakers to ensure security. The language of deterrence reaches multiple levels of policy. From 
nuclear warfare (mutually assured destruction,) to traffic stops, (“this time is a warning.”) The 
language of deterrence serves a different purpose for the Border Patrol. Rather than just 
communicating threat of repercussion for an action deemed unlawful, the language of deterrence 
is also used to describe Draconian strategies of preventing border crossings, and to communicate 
to the public (the U.S. public) that the agency has a plan and has put it into action.  
The targets of deterrence, or the allegedly deterred, are referenced in policy, reports, and 
the press as “illegals,” their deaths as “unintended consequences” of PTD. So then, when they do 
suffer, it is their fault for not listening to the message the U.S. sent them. The problem with that 
logic is twofold. First, PTD is ineffective at deterring border crossers. Second, it falsely 
represents their deaths as collateral damage. It becomes an argument about the greater good. 
Border Patrol must make sacrifices to protect the U.S. One of those sacrifices is letting people 
die. There is evidence of their negligence and the violations that cause physical harm and death 
to border crossers. Farmers and other landowners file complaints about Border Patrol turning 
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their property into a graveyard. Advocacy groups find the remains of missing persons in the 
desert. 
Border Patrol has the capabilities to help people, yet they abandon them. It is evidence 
that Border Patrol and border crossers are not on the same side of the issue. If the situation on the 
border was a war, the Borderlands would no-man’s-land and it would be obvious who the key 
players were. Reece Jones, author of ​Violent Borders ​, thinks it is a war. However, what is 
happening on the southern border is not a war. It is not easily definable. It can be better 
understood by looking at the language of violence. 
“Violence” is an important theme in policy and discussion surrounding PTD. As raised 
previously, the 1994 Strategic Plan identifies “violence” as an potential indicator that the policy 
is working. Violence in that case most likely referred to aggressive resistance to PTD, targeting 
Border Patrol. In an article published by CBS News in 2011, former Alabama Republican 
Representative Mo Brooks was quoted saying, in reference to undocumented immigrants in the 
U.S., “I’ll do anything short of shooting them.”  He told a CBS affiliate  “that illegal 83 84
immigrants ‘are clogging up our emergency rooms and making our education system more 
expensive,’ adding that a local jail is overstuffed with ‘illegal aliens.’” People who are of the 
belief that rights granted by a sovereign nation should only be awarded based on a 
carefully-organized and exclusive system with a paper  trail, consider it, and have made it, an 85
imprisonable offence to seek benefits without the proper paperwork -- even life-sustaining 
83 Montopoli, Brian. “Rep Mo Brooks: I’ll do ‘anything short of shooting” illegal immigrants.” ​CBS News. ​July 13, 
2011.    https://www.cbsnews.com/news/rep-mo-brooks-ill-do-anything-short-of-shooting-illegal-immigrants/ 
84 WHNT 
85 Also see: money 
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In their commitment to their multi-phase plan, Border Patrol has taken action against 
humanitarian groups attempting to counter the effects of PTD. There have been multiple 
instances in which Border Patrol destroyed supplies left by NGOs for people traveling through 
inhospitable areas around the border. ​Disappeared​, a report co-published by No Más Muertes 
and La Coalición de Derechos Humanos includes evidence of harm incurred as a direct result of 
Border Patrol’s actions. No Más Muertes,  an NGO committed to ending migrant deaths, allege 86
that video footage in which three Border Patrol agents kick over open water jugs on the ground 
and then walk off depicts U.S. Border Patrol agents destroying humanitarian aid supplies mean 
for border crossers. They also allege that it is a recurring practice of Border Patrol.  A 87
spokesperson for the Tucson sector where the incident took place refuted that claim and urged 
anyone with information about individuals engaging in similar acts to report them. Border Patrol 
might not encourage sabotaging humanitarian aid, but PTD is reliant on deprivation. 
Humanitarian efforts attempting to compensate for the environment’s lack of resources 
undermine that condition, and they have taken No Más Muertes to court for it. Nine members 
face charges of “​Abandonment of Personal Property​, ​Entering a Wilderness Area Without a 
Permit​, and ​Driving in a Wilderness Area​.” One member, Scott Warren, ​faces up to twenty years 
in prison.  88
86 “No More Deaths” 
87 Carroll, Rory. “US border patrol routinely sabotages water left for migrants, report says.” ​The Guardian. ​Jan. 17, 
2018.   https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/17/us-border-patrol-sabotage-aid-migrants-mexico-arizona 
88 No More Deaths. “​#DropTheCharges!​” nomoredeaths.org.  
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With violence comes death. With death comes evidence of violence. The contradiction 
there is that the evidence is invisible by virtue of where it occurs. Dissemination is the only tactic 
that is actually deterrence, even though all the tactics fall under Border Patrol’s concept of PTD. 
Through desolation, Border Patrol hushes up the deaths and disappearances to avoid criticism for 
inhumane tactics. In doing so, it betrays the nature of deterrence. 
Missing Persons 
In the past thirty to forty years, there has been a shift toward historical archaeology, in 
which sites do have archival sources, which was not the norm. The archaeology adds subtlety 
and nuance to the archival sources. For archaeologists to legally be able to excavate a site, it 
must have been uninhabited for 50 or more years. Even so, the Colibrí Center for Human Rights, 
led by co-founder and medical archaeologist Robin Reineke, is doing excavations and site 
surveys in Arizona.  
Jeff Jurgen is a professor of Anthropology at Bard College in New York. His best 
estimate based on the timeline of PTD is that public archaeology began in the late 1990s. De 
León’s work is considered cutting edge. They are essentially doing forensic work without soft 
tissue. What can researchers glean from very fragmentary evidence like pieces of bone? Maybe it 
is not possible to identify missing persons with that limited evidence, but it could serve another 
purpose: to help prove that necropolitics is in use. A more complex effect is that it can make 
deaths more visible. 
Public archeology doesn’t wait for time to elapse before site surveys or excavations 
begin. Many would argue that it resembles forensics, which it does, but its anchor in human 
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rights organizations differentiates it and makes possible multiple outcomes or applications. They 
can connect families and loved ones with personal effects, remains, or information regarding 
missing persons. However, because they do so not for the sake of an open or cold case, their 
findings are not treated like a forensic report would be. Rather than a victim and a perpetrator, 
they can act as political forensic researchers, identifying the most dangerous routes and 
connecting findings to archival information on changes or patterns in border security. From that 
merging of perspectives and evidence, they hypothesize causes of death and Border Patrol’s 
intentions, just as we can do with PTD. 
Professor Jurgens believes archaeology could reconstruct migratory routes otherwise out 
of public view, and make them visible. It is counterintuitive that the death at the border is 
invisible, even though the threat of death is used as a deterrent. The invisibility of the threat is at 
odds with what deterrence is. Even when visible, as in the EU and the mediterranean, death both 
precedes (deaths occurring in origin nations) and coincides with the border, so the death on the 
border is no different, it is just more death, more disappearance, and more family separation. 
Tearing families apart is both an incentive forcing people to attempt to enter the U.S. and a 
deterrent meant to keep them out. When horror occurs everywhere, you have never arrived. In 
fact, what the U.S. does in using deterrence is eliminate the possibility of arrival. Furthermore, 
identifying remains of the deceased can aim to reconcile the rights to life and identity that were 
stripped from them in the manner of their passing. 
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Is It Really Deterrence? 
Are there fewer people attempting  to cross the border? No. Has the strategy caused 89
people to decide not to cross the border, either for the first time or again? Border Patrol does not 
know. If Border Patrol has launched an investigation into that question, they have not shared it 
with the public. What they have shared is policy that identifies indicators of success of PTD to 
include loss of life, as is clear in the figure on page 18.  
Not only is the strategic response to increased border crossings inconsistent with the 
reality of the situation - that hundreds of thousands of people are in danger or without means and 
are seeking protection and a reasonable quality of life in the U.S. - but it is also being done 
incorrectly. In Daniel S. Nagin’s paper, “Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” he finds, 
through analysis of statistical evidence and theory, that “certainty of apprehension, not the 
severity of the ensuing legal consequence, is the more effective deterrent.”  As Nagin argues, 90
“The police deter crime when they do things that strengthen a criminal’s perception of the 
certainty of being caught. Strategies that use the police as ‘sentinels,’ such as hot spots policing, 
are particularly effective. A criminal’s behavior is more likely to be influenced by seeing a police 
officer with handcuffs and a radio than by a new law increasing penalties.”  Essentially, 91
deterrence in the context of immigration means officials manipulating people in such a way that 
they are able to control who lives or dies by giving them two terrible options. Either border 
89 Successfully or unsuccessfully, doesn’t matter 
90 Nagin, Daniel S., "Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century," in Crime and Justice in America: 1975-2025, ed. M. 
Tonry, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2013: 199-264. 
91 Ibid. 
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crossers stay where they are and suffer there, or come here and suffer. Done in the name of 
upholding sovereignty, deterrence becomes an element of necropolitics. 
 
Necropolitics 
Deterrence does not necessarily require that people die, but it also does not require that 
they live. Especially now, the government has made the targets of PTD out to be both 
prospective citizens and enemies of the state.  that they do not exist within the U.S., and their 
existence when outside the U.S. public sphere is of so little importance that their deaths do not 
matter. Where deterrence turns deadly is when it interacts with necropolitics. In Achille 
Mbembe’s paper on necropolitics, he initially identifies the link between politics and death by 
arguing the politics is the product of death, then complicates their relationship by explaining how 
sovereignty is “expressed predominantly as the right to kill.”  He draws on Foucault's concept of 92
biopower, which “function[s] through dividing people into those who must live and those who 
must die.”  As I have proposed, Border Patrol’s primary goal is to keep border crossers out of 93
the U.S., and the main way they do that is by putting them in life-threatening situations. There is 
really no theory that entirely explains PTD, but in this way, necropolitics comes closer than most. 
People and organizations that counter PTD are also automatically, and probably 
inadvertently, countering necropolitics. Their efforts are well-intended, but they also complicate 
the situation. The strategic  problem with using desolation as an element of PTD is that the 94
92 Mbembe p. 16. 
93 Mbembe p. 16. 
94 As opposed to moral. 
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resulting deaths are invisible. I have argued that Border Patrol is aware that PTD is ineffective, 
revealing that the real purpose of tactics like Operation Blockade, walls ending in the wilderness, 
and chase-and-scatter operations is to prevent border crossers from entering the U.S. at all costs. 
In line with that logic, counter-PTD operations have a complex role in PTD. They make it work 
better. They are a major avenue through which Border Patrol communicates with border crossers, 
something Border Patrol has proven to be minimally committed to doing. Counter-PTD efforts 
serve Border Patrol, but also expose it as the source of the violence. Border Patrol is responsible 
for the deaths of thousands of people and they cannot hide it, although they try. That is why 
groups like No Mas Muertes, and the archaeological professionals and volunteers that join their 
ranks, are necessary. Without them, Border Patrol might have a chance at claiming innocence. 
Conclusion 
The mission of Border Patrol is muddled. They are tasked with stopping illegal 
immigration, but rather than receive money for personnel to coordinate between community 
members and agents, their budget is invested heavily in PTD. Engaging with border 
communities, providing sustainable and relevant aid to Central America, providing effective 
grassroots organizations with a federal-scale budget, and demilitarizing the border would be huge 
improvements. However, before any of that is possible, the U.S. needs to reverse those 
deterrence policies that adversely affect border crossers. 
By collecting the elements of the Border Patrol’s history of deterrence and the response to 
the harm it causes and seeing how the two interact, I have done my best to explain the situation 
in a way that it has not traditionally been perceived. I explored the issue from a political and 
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human rights perspective, but rather than have either or both of those be the conclusion(s) about 
the situation on the southern border, I employed them simultaneously to form a new argument: 
that through its policy of “Prevention Through Deterrence,” the U.S. Border Patrol is, with the 
help of other political entities, engaging in a unique case of necropolitics. Finally, the 
humanitarian efforts to counter PTD are vital to revealing and subsequently undoing the damage 
Border Patrol has caused for so long. 
 

 









































